JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Much controversy about causality and related concepts has arisen in the philosophical literature, and the haze surrounding the discussion has spread to other fields, among them econometrics. This brief outline stresses certain general principles and ideas that are relevant for actual research activity in the natural and social sciences. The main points are: (1) The concept of causality is indispensable and fundamental to all science; (2) The controversial issues are not latent in the concept of causality itself, but in certain questionable hypotheses, so-called "laws of causality," such as the universal scope of causality, the certainty (irrevocability) of a cause-effect relationship, the connection of causality with theories of induction, the principles of determinism and freedom of the will, etc; (3) A definition of causality which seems to be adequate from both common-sense and scientific points of view is suggested with reference to the well-known situation of the controlled experiment; (4) Some general remarks on statistical methods from the viewpoint of the dual distinction between descriptive and explanatory analysis and between experimental and nonexperimental observations are made; (5-6) Some comments are offered on causal relations as a tool in econometrics, with special regard to the rationale of different types of economic models.
science, and in the sphere of explanation it is equally obvious that the concept of causality is omnipresent and fundamental. This holds true for all stages of scientific study, from common sense orientation and prescientific approaches in general to the most advanced branches of professional science, as shown by the host of terms with a causal content, such as influence, dependence, effect, stimulus-response, active substance, etc.
2. In the philosophical discussion of causality, one of the many ways of trying to avoid difficulties is to remove the word "causality" from the vocabulary, and to replace it with some uncommitted term, for example, "functional relation" or "predictability." It is clear, however, that the difficulties cannot be solved in this way, for if scientific analysis were stripped of all terms with a causal content, nothing would remain but description and formalism. It is also clear that the difficulties are not really inherent in the concept of causality; they arise from the more or less unwarranted implications and generalizations with which the concept has been burdened. 2 For example, consider conclusions like Such statements are typical of the daily routine in the scientific workshop. In both cases causality is an essential element in the conclusion, and no difficulty arises since the statements are limited to specified situations. The trouble begins when we formulate general "laws" of causality, for example, "every event is causally related to something else," or "same cause, same effect." Such "causal laws" may be stimulating as working hypotheses, they may be fascinating to some minds, irrelevant or absurd to others; but, in any case, they do not belong to the actual tools of scientific research, and sterile discussion about such "laws" need not throw any shadow on the concept of causality.
3. Modern theory of knowledge as embodied in logical empiricism aims at a realistic description and analysis of how science actually works, in contradistinction to earlier philosophizing systems that tried to base the theory of knowledge upon metaphysical or suprascientific principles (Descartes' "cogito ergo sum," Kant's "das Ding an sich," Fichte's "Ego," and so on).3 It is a great achievement of the modern theory to have cleared away several old matters of dispute, among those the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and certain aspects of the freedom of the will, by showing that such questions are wrongly posed in the sense that a definite answer can neither be confirmed nor rejected on the basis of empirical observations. This work, however, took the form of a systematic program only a few decades ago and much remains to be done.
The author, for one, has the impression that the progress of logical empiricism is not so rapid as might have been expected. In particular, great confusion exists in the discussion of many fundamental issues in the natural and social sciences (the rationale of induction, prediction as a purpose of historical science, etc.). To a large extent this may be due to the fact that the philosophical discussion of the principles underlying a subject-matter science requires close collaboration between philosophy and other sciences, and, it is well known, there are many obstacles (linguistic, psychological, institutional) to overcome in collaboration between two sciences, obstacles which are perhaps at their worst when it comes to fundamentals in the theory of knowledge. There is the further point that philosophers, like other scientists, are subject to mental inertia, and there is a strong impact of ageless traditions in philosophic inbreeding. To support such a heretic view by examples, we note that the philosophical journals still devote an undue amount of space to sophistic questions such as "the possibility of negation," or "the existence of other minds," with contributions even from the best representatives of logical empiricism. Regarding the first example, we note (not to break open doors, but to recall some basic notions) that in science it is a fundamental working principle to keep apart that which is fact, empirical observations, and that which is theory, speculative thoughts. This principle is also a cornerstone in logical empiricism. Now, it may be argued that the elements of empirical observation are positive statements, not involving negations, but in the theoretical sphere, at all stages of prescientific and scientific development, it is found convenient from the point of view of mental economy to introduce the concept of negation as a specific variant of positive statement. If we take the second example, this is a hypothesis so inevitable and perfectly reliable in its consequences that it is not seriously doubted at any stage of development, and in practice it is permanently used even by the most sceptical philosopher; on the other hand, a hypothesis it is and will always remain, for statements about other minds must necessarily involve some theoretical element that can never be affirmed with absolute certainty on the basis of observations of overt behaviour.
The philosophic discussion of causality provides plenty of material for our heretic views. It is true that much of the obscurity surrounding the notion of causality has been cleared away by ambitious works written in the spirit of logical empiricism, but it is also true that the problems investigated are posed by traditional philosophy rather than by the causal concepts actually used in modern science. The main objects of investigation have been the general "laws" of causality which are exemplified in section 2 above.4 These have proved to be untenable, but such "laws" do not really play an active part in modern science. On the other hand, little or no progress has been made in the urgent task of investigating the causal concepts actually employed. As a result there is a widespread uneasiness about the term causality, and a tendency to remove this term from the picture together with its "laws," which indeed is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. 5 The first requisite for a fruitful discussion about causality is an adequate definition of the concept. This is perhaps the weakest point in the philosophical discussion. Either the concept is not defined at all-as if its properties could be derived from common sense considerations or created "aus der Tiefe seines Bewusstseins," as in the anecdote about the three essays on the camel-or the definition is too narrow, as when differential equations are framed as the type case of causal relations, thus providing a basis for comments on determinism and the equation-solving Laplacean spirit. Incidentally, it should be clear from the above comments that the author does not wish to treat the philosophers as a scapegoat for the unsatisfactory state of things: it cannot be denied that scientists in general have rested content with very vague notions about causality and related concepts.
What then is to be understood by causality? To obtain an answer (it may be that there are several satisfactory answers) it is natural first to examine the tools the scientist has at his disposal for establishing a causal relationship. The supreme tool is the controlled experiment. Briefly stated, one or more variables are under the experimenter's control, and for suitably chosen values of these he observes the values of one or more other variables in whose variation he is interested. Then, if the experiment reveals that an observed variable varies systematically as the controlled variables are allowed to vary, this relationship is a type case of a causal relation. By replication of the experiment the causal relation can be tested by other experimenters, and herein lies the supremacy of the experimental method.
The controlled variables of the experiment are called cause variables, the observed variables are called dependent or effect variables. In the simplest case there is one cause variable, say x, and one effect variable, say y, so that the causal relation may be formally expressed as y = f(x), whereas y = f(xI, *,Xh) covers the case of one effect variable y and several cause variables xi, *., xI&. In a number of classical experiments the causal relationship is exact or nearly so. This happens in Boyle-Mariotte's law, say P = cT/V or V = cT/P, where the first formula refers to an experiment arranged so that temperature T and volume V are controlled variables and pressure P is the effect variable, while in the second case the experiment has temperature T and pressure P for controlled variables and volume V for effect variable.6 In other cases, and these include the triumphs of the experimental method in the biological and medical spheres, the causal relation is subject to disturbance from biotype variation and other uncontrolled and more or less random factors. The experiment, if properly designed and analysed, will then bring out the causal relation as an average relationship subject to disturbance, in symbols y = f(x) + z, or in generaly = f(x1, l , Xh) + z, where z stands for the disturbance. We have here a situation in which statistical methods render useful service. The causal relationship is brought out by the use of statistical regression analysis, viz. by forming the regression of the effect variable upon the cause variable or variables. The regression will in general be curvilinear. Regarding the proviso that the experiment must be properly designed, an essential point is that it should be randomized in the sense of R. A. Causal relation and causality are theoretical concepts, not empirical. This is obvious in the nonexperimental case; and in the experimental case the typical situation is one in which the causal relation enters as a hypothesis to be tested or demonstrated. Logically, the concept is therefore the same in the two cases; and in distinguishing between them our intention is mainly to stress that the test of the causal hypothesis is more direct and indisputable in the experimental case. We note further that our definition conforms to the usage of causality and related words in ordinary language. The controlled experiment is, in fact, nothing but a systematic way of collecting experience, and from a logical point of view the causal notions involved are of the same type as those which are all-pervading even in the earliest stages of prescientific experience, for example, "the water will boil if you put it over the fire" or "the crop will be larger if you manure the soil."
Regarding the attempts to replace causality by other terms we note that "functional relation" is not satisfactory. "Directed functional relation" would be better, but even this term is too formalistic; for example, relation (3) is directed without being causal.8 To take another suggestion, "predictability" is more closely related to "correlation" than to "causality." In fact, frequently A is predictable from B owing to both A and B having a common cause C, and in such cases it would not be in conformity with current usage of ordinary or scientific language to say that predictability is synonymous with causality. In section 4 we return to the distinction between causality and predictability.
4. We have seen that the logical interpretation of causal relationships is the same in experimental and nonexperimental situations. From a statistical point of view, on the other hand, there are deep-going differences between the two cases. As background for our comments on causal relations in econometrics we want to take a bird's-eye view of statistical methods, with special regard to the nature of problems in various fields of application.
We have grouped statistical methods by a fourfold table (see below), according as statistics is used for the purpose of description or explanation, and according as the data are experimental or nonexperimental. In the NW region we recognize the classical field of statistics, with its centre in demographic applications and widening at an early stage over other social sciences. The nineteenth century methods were mainly descriptive, and included such things as the calculation of frequencies, averages, quantiles, index numbers, and so on. The "Continental school" had introduced some few explanatory methods; these were large-sample approaches of a simple type, but they were nonetheless very useful in the hands of those who understood their reach and limitation. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the list included significance tests for frequencies and averages by the three-times-sigma rule, the least-squares method for the fitting of linear and polynomial trends, and the Lexis divergence coefficient with its interpretation in terms of Bernoulli, Poisson, and Lexis schemes. When applied to the nonexperimental data of social sciences these methods belong to the SW region of our table.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the "English school" introduced statistical methods into biology and related natural sciences. With Galton, K. Pearson, and Yule as pioneers, the methods of statistical analysis entered a phase of forceful development. These impulses soon spread to agricultural research and other experimental fields of application, and with the epoch-making works of R. A. Fisher the centre of gravity of statistical theory moved from the NW to the SE region of our table. Some of Fisher's methods are designed with a view to experimental data, notably randomization and analysis of variance. Some of his contributions join the least-squares method in being of general scope within the claim that his definition conforms to the common-sense concept of causality. For one thing, Simon [16, p. 59] applies his definition to one of Girshick and Haavelmo's models [7] , and although the model involves no explanatory relation for the price variable, Simon concludes that price is causally dependent upon four specified variables of the model. Moreover, with reference to the logical distinction between object language and metalanguage, Simon states that causality according to his definition belongs to metalanguage, whereas the author believes that the common-sense concept of causality belongs to object language and should be defined accordingly. However, the author does not wish to deny that there exist meaningful statements that extend the concept into metalanguage, for example: "Newton's laws are causal laws." From the point of view of the textbook treatment of statistical methods, the above distinction between explanation and description is somewhat unconventional, and in particular it will be noted that the distinction cuts across the field of correlation analysis. Correlation measures are always descriptive, among them the correlation coefficient and Yule's association coefficient. Regression relations, on the other hand, may serve purposes of explanation or of description, depending upon the situation. Generally speaking, a regression relation may or may not involve a causal hypothesis, and the introduction of a causal hypothesis makes the analysis more determinate and the resulting conclusions more specific. The difference in the conclusions is particularly important in forecast applications, as will presently be illustrated by the regression (4). If no causal hypothesis is involved, the regression of the "regressand" y upon the "regressors" x1, ***, xh indicates nothing but an average relationship in the particular sample from which the regression is derived. On the other hand, if the regression relation is based upon a causal hypothesis the relationship not only can be used as before to predict y for given x1, --*, Xh, but can now also be used for other purposes, just as can a genuine causal relation. For example, the approximate representation of y in terms of x1, * *, xh may be used for substitution into another relationship where y plays the part of a causal variable.9 For another example, consider the case of one regressor x. If we ask what value x of the cause variable will give rise to a prescribed value y of the effect variable, an estimate of x can be obtained from the inverse of the causal relationship, in the same way as in (3).10 Such causal applications of the regression relation are, of course, subject to limitations imposed by the subject-matter interpretation of the relation.
NW, SE, and SW regions (the NE region is analogous to the NW region from the point of view of statistical theory
There are a few remarks to be made on the statistical treatment of causal relations, with special regard to the difference between the situations encountered in the SE and SW regions. In the SE region the estimation of the relation between cause and effect poses itself as a simple regression problem. Thanks to the controlled variation of cause variables, the neutralization of disturbances by means of randomization, and the independence between observations that can be achieved at least approximately, the regression analysis becomes a matter of streamlined routine." The resulting estimates of regression coefficients are unbiased, and the sampling errors can be evaluated with exactitude; if the disturbances have normal distributions the estimates are even of optimal efficiency and their confidence intervals can be evaluated. For the study of interaction between causal factors, the analysis of variance provides a specialized regression technique.
In the SW region the estimation of causal relations by the use of regression analysis is hampered by the fact that randomization is not available. For example, considering the current method for estimating income elasticities on the basis of family budget data, let is not signalled by the standard error of a regression coefficient, for this accounts only for the sampling error. It is also a familiar fact that no routine methods are available for guarding ourselves against a specification error. What can be done is to introduce, more or less tentatively, further factors as explanatory variables in the hypothetical demand function (the family size, the social stratum, etc.) and to perform a corresponding statistical estimation by the use of multiple regression analysis or some related device.'2 We notice the shift of emphasis between the SE and SW regions in the statistical estimation of causal relations. In SE the interest centers on the design of the experiment, and in particular on making the sampling errors as small as possible. In SW the primary thing is the specification of the causal hypothesis; and this is a question for subject-matter theory, not for statistics. In other words, to avoid specification errors the statistical analysis must be coordinated with subject-matter theory. A shift in emphasis is further due to the fact that significance tests of the standard type are of limited scope in the analysis of nonexperimental data. Instead, tests specially devised for the situation come into the foreground, ad hoc tests based on any sort of theoretical or empirical evidence.'3 It is also clear that the real touchstone for the significance of, the results obtained lies in prediction, in comparing the actual development with a forecast based on the statistical analysis. Only a predictional test is able to show whether or not the causal relationship arrived at is useful for the purpose for which it is intended.
Regarding the SW region we have stressed that the statistical analysis has to be coordinated with subject-matter theory, both in specifying the hypothetical relationships and in testing the significance of their estimates. Hence the statistical methods of this region cannot profitably be set forth in a general, formal manner; they split up into a number of specialized topics, or hybrids between statistics and subject-matter theories, such as demography, econometrics, sociometry, and so on. Another type of specialization is present in time-series analysis, which enters the SW region because time is a variable that cannot be controlled in the sense of scientific experiment. In passing we note that the tendency towards specialization in the SW region goes a long way to explain why it is so difficult to arrange courses and write textbooks in general statistics. Both in NW and SE the statistical methods lend themselves to a general and formal treatment, as evidenced by the excellent textbooks in "classic" and "modem" statistics, respectively. The attempts to amalgamate the two types of textbooks have not been altogether satisfactory, however, and in such a setting the urgent task of writing an integrated text is rather unprofitable, since the NW and SE regions deal not only with different types of problems but also with different types of data. An integrated exposition of statistical method should include also the SW region, but here the significance problems lie deeper and the exposition will degenerate into formalism unless it is coordinated with subjectmatter material from demography and other specialized sectors. The task is made no easier by the fact that the NW and SE regions are well developed as compared with the SW region where the many specialized fields of statistical analysis are very unevenly cultivated. There are many signs, however, that the SW region with its stubborn problems is gaining increased interest among experienced research workers, and it is a reasonable conjecture that the development will continue, bringing SW more in balance with the NW and SE regions.
In Generally speaking, the purpose of dynamic models is to explain economic phenomena in terms of forces that underlie their variation, and static models deal with the special case of phenomena at rest.'5 The Cournot model is a typical static model; its purpose is to explain the general observation that in a market of free competition we find, on the whole, stable prices and a stable balance between production and consumption. Cournot's model involves three economic forces, viz. (a) the consumers' demand for the commodity considered, demand d being explained as a function of the commodity price p; (b) the producers' supply of the commodity, supply s being explained as another function of price; and (c) certain price-adjusting forces that make price tend towards the value p p* for which demand equals supply. Dynamic models were employed for various purposes in pioneer works by 14 Adopting the least-squares approach, a rigorous method of factor analysis has recently been developed by P. Whittle, [20] . ' , In [26, ch. 3.21, the reader will find comments and references on static vs. dynamic analysis in general and on models (5) and (6) 
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Under conditions that need not be specified here, it can be shown that if t is allowed to increase indefinitely we get the limit relations Recursive systems have been systematically utilized by Tinbergen in a series of pioneering works attempting to coordinate economic theory and statistical analysis."7 We recall three important points in his contributions to the theory and application of recursive systems.
(1) Economic forces are exerted by persons, acting individually or in groups, unorganized or organized in enterprises, social institutions or other more or less well-defined units. In general, the causal relationships of economics should be specified so as to refer to economic units in this sense, and so as to explain how their actions or behaviour are influenced by various causal factors.
For example, the economic units in the first two relations of models (5) and (6) are the group of consumers and the group of producers, respectively. As to the third relation, the traditional verbal explanations of (5, c) and (6, c) do not specify the equilibrium forces in terms of economic units, a lack of concreteness that seems to have given rise to some formalism and confusion about basic issues in demand-supply models and perhaps also in price theory in general. To supplement the models in this respect we take the third unit to be the group of merchants, for in an ordinary market merchants have the function of bringing demand into contact with supply and of regulating price adjustments. Relation (9, c) is required to indicate by way of a first approximation what pattern merchants follow when adjusting the market price. '8 As another example, the theory of monopolistic production uses models different from (9), supply and price being determined by the monopolist so as to maximize his profit. The three economic units of model (9) will in general be partly overlapping groups of individuals, but as a first approximation it is reasonable to assume that the three groups are autonomous. For example, if we assume that merchants reduce the parameter -y in (9, c), i.e., if they begin to dampen or retard the price adjustments that are induced by the differences between demand and supply (a change in their price policy that would require larger stocks), such a change need not affect the demand and supply elasticities of the market.
In the monopolistic model, supply and price relations are not mutually autonomous, but they are autonomous relative to the demand relation.
(3) For the statistical treatment of his models, Tinbergen adopts the traditional method of least-squares regression. Thus, every relation of the model is estimated by a regression relation. In particular, the regression residual is interpreted as a disturbance due to causal factors not explicitly accounted for in the theoretical relation.
In recent econometric literature the application of least-squares regression has been questioned, and according to an argument by T. Haavelmo the method will in general give biased estimates when applied to economic models."' Never convinced by this argument, the present author has taken up the rationale of regression methods for review, with special regard to the treatment of timeseries and other nonexperimental data. The results obtained include the following points. 20 (a) The method of least-squares regression is unbiased and consistent, in the large-sample sense, on the assumption that the explanatory variables of the theoretical relationship are uncorrelated with the disturbance. The novel feature in this theorem is that the disturbances referring to the different observations of the time series or sample under analysis need not be independent as in the classical theory.
(b) The theorem under (a) is valid irrespective of whether the theoretical relationship to be estimated is single or forms part of a system. In particular, the theorem applies to least-squares regression as used for the estimation of recursive systems.
(c) The specification error of a regression coefficient is subject to a "proximity theorem," to the effect that if the disturbance has a small standard deviation, say of order E, and has a small correlation with the explanatory variables, say of order 6, then the specification error will be small of a higher order, viz., IE.
(d) The classical formula for the standard error of a regression coefficient being based on the assumption that the disturbances of the different observations are independent, a more general formula is given which allows for intercorrelation among the disturbances. 19 See [9] and [7] . The following quotation is typical of the wholesale dismissal not only of least-squares regression but also of single-equation models in general: "That is, it is impossible to derive statistically the demand functions from market data without specifying the supply functions involved." (Girshick and Haavelmo, [ According to the theorems referred to in (a)-(d), the method of least-squares regression is, in principle, appropriate for the purpose for which it has been employed by Tinbergen. This statement, however, implies no appraisal of the factual results of his statistical investigations. A macroeconomic model with some 50 different relations and over 100 parameters to be estimated is clearly a case for our general remark in section 4 about significance tests. Standard errors and other formal significance tests are here of secondary relevance compared with the question of specification error; but the presence and possible magnitude of specification errors are difficult to judge, if this can be done at all in models whose construction involves a close coordination of economic theory and all kinds of prior experience. The situation is much more difficult than, say, in demand analysis, where the elasticity estimates referring to different commodities, different social strata, etc., can be subjected to various checks and cross-checks. It is therefore safe to say that an appraisal of macroeconomic models of Tinbergen's type will have to be based chiefly upon predictional tests.
6. It stands to reason that recursive models are of a very wide scope, at least theoretically, and it can even be rigorously proved that any set of statistical time-series lends itself to formal representation in terms of a recursive system. In practice, however, a recursive analysis cannot always be carried through; it may be that statistical data that correspond to the hypothetical model are not available, or that the causal interrelations are so complex that the model constructor cannot establish a working hypothesis in functional form, or that other obstacles stand in the way. In such cases the recursive approach will have to be modified or supplemented, and it would seem that different situations require different devices for this purpose. On one or two occasions the author has touched upon problems of this type.2' In concluding this article we discuss briefly the situation of complex relationships.
Returning to model (9), suppose we are primarily interested in the demand relation, or dt = D(pt). Suppose further that this relation is sufficiently realistic for our purpose, but the supply and price relations (9, b-c) are far from realistic. The simplest device would then be to regard supply st and price pt as exogenous variables, so that the model would reduce to the single relation (9, a). We note that such a modification of the model does not disturb the statistical treatment; the estimation of the demand relation by regression analysis will be precisely the same as in the complete model (9, a-c).
For a second example, suppose we are interested in forecasting supply se and price pt on the basis of the past development of the three variables. As before, suppose further that hypothesis (9, a) is realistic, but that the causal relations behind supply and price are so complex that we cannot specify a hypothesis about them. We can then form estimates for st and pt in terms of the previous development, say ( where S and P are specified functions. Relations of this type can be estimated more or less tentatively by ordinary regression analysis (in general multiple and curvilinear), and as usual the residuals ut and vt are interpreted as disturbances. We note that each of the relations (10, a-b) allows a causal interpretation. We note further that relation (10, a) can be interpreted as a conditional probability distribution for st , with S(d-1 , st_-, pt-l, *dt-2 * * ) for conditional expectation and dt_1, st_-, *** for conditional variables, and similarly for relation (10, b) . In the special case of linear relations and normal distributions, the two conditional distributions (10, a-b) will define a joint conditional distribution for st and pt, which has dt1, st-i, *** for conditional variables, and in which the variances and the covariance of ut and vt enter as parameters. Both ut and Vt will then be independent of the conditional variables, and at the same time ut and vt will in general be intercorrelated. Regarding the demand relation (9, a) we note that its estimation by regression analysis will again be precisely the same as in the original model (9, a-c).
The above examples are extremely simple, but we see that the arguments are general, so that the device extends to any recursive system and to joint conditional distributions for any number of variables. A recursive system forms a causal chain with one effect variable in each link, while in the generalized approach there are one or more effect variables in each link, and these are causally explained as being jointly dependent upoi variables in the previous links. Let the effect variables thus grouped in a link be referred to as a link set. Thus, for each variable in a link set we form a causal relation involving endogenous variables of previous links and exogenous variables of the same and previous links. Such a causal relation may be interpreted as a conditional probability distribution. Taken together, the conditional distributions referring to a link set constitute a joint probability distribution for the set. The methods of leastsquares regression apply for the statistical estimation of the conditional distributions.
It will be noted that the above generalization of recursive systems is a type of model which is somewhat related to the theory of structural systems, the wellknown approach developed by a group of research workers associated with the Cowles Commission.22 The point of contact lies in the joint conditional distribution of a link set, which from a formal viewpoint is similar to the distribution that specifies the reduced form for a subset of relations of a structural system. From the point of view of subject-matter analysis, on the other hand, the present type of model differs from the structural approach, inasmuch as the causal interpretation of the relationships is entirely different. In our model the relations of a link set are causal in the sense of (10), whereas the reduced form of a structural system does not allow such causal interpretation. More precisely, in structural models the causal relations, often called behaviour relations, are mixed with non-causal relations in the form of identities or equilibrium relations, and the reduced form is a formal construct derived by linear combination of the causal and non-causal relations of the model. Comparing the implications of the two types of models, the most striking difference is perhaps that there are no identification problems in the present approach.
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